The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that can benefit from cloud infrastructure. In a cloud-based IoT network, a variety of data is collected by smart devices and transmitted to a cloud server. However, since the data may contain sensitive information about individuals, providing confidentiality and access control is essential to protect the users' privacy. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising tool to provide these requirements. However, most of ABE schemes neither provide efficient encryption and decryption mechanisms nor offer flexible and efficient key delegation and user revocation approaches. In this paper, to address these issues, we propose a lightweight revocable hierarchical ABE (LW-RHABE) scheme. In our scheme, computation overhead on the user side is very efficient, and most of the computational operations are performed by the cloud server. Also, using the hierarchical model, our scheme offers flexible and scalable key delegation and user revocation mechanisms. Indeed, in our scheme, key delegation and user revocation associated with each attribute can be handled by several key authorities. We provide the security definition for LW-RHABE, and we prove its security in the standard model and under the hardness assumption of the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology has facilitated the improvement of several systems ranging from the current healthcare and assisted living systems to smart city systems [1] . According to the report published by Gartner [2] , it is expected that the number of machine to machine (M2M) connections will increase from 5.6 billion in 2016 to more than 27 billion in 2024. Also, the report states that the number of smart devices connected to the internet network will be dramatically increased from 8.4 billion in 2020 to 20 billion in 2022. Moreover, it is predicted that the revenue of the IoT industry will significantly increase from 892 billion in 2018 to four trillion by 2025 [3] . Observing the surges in the numbers, one expects that IoT
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will become one of the major forthcoming markets making a cornerstone of the expanding digital economy.
However, smart devices and sensors in IoT networks usually suffer from extremely limited processing and storage resources. To address these constraints, a promising way is to interconnect IoT networks with cloud servers to benefit from the elastically scalable and always available storage and computational services offered by the cloud computing paradigm [4] , [5] . The cloud-based IoT systems facilitate storage and processing of the collected data, provide user mobility, and make using the same data in multiple services possible.
However, outsourcing the collected data to a cloud server raises concerns over data confidentiality and fine-grained access control, since the cloud cannot be considered as a trusted party. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [6] - [8] is one of the most promising methods to the mentioned problems. Generally, ABE schemes can be divided into three VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ categories key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [9] , ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [10] , and dual policy ABE (DP-ABE) [11] . In a KP-ABE scheme, a data user's secret-key is associated with an access control policy defined by the central authority, and each ciphertext is labeled by a set of descriptive attributes determined by a data owner. A data user can recover the data file embedded in a ciphertext only if the attribute set corresponding to the ciphertext satisfies the data user's access control policy. However, in a CP-ABE scheme, a data user's secret-key is associated with an attribute set, and each ciphertext is associated with an access control policy defined by a data owner. A data user can recover the data corresponding to a ciphertext only if its attributes satisfy the access control policy of the ciphertext. DP-ABE schemes can be considered as a combination of KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes. In such schemes, each ciphertext is associated with both a set of descriptive attributes and an access control policy. Also, each data user's secret-key corresponds to an attribute set and an access control policy defined by the central authority. It seems that CP-ABE schemes offer more flexibility for data owners, as in such schemes, the central authority does not have any role in determining the access rights of data users, and data owners can independently determine the authorized users to access their data. However, since the sensors and smart devices in IoT networks have limited processing and storage resources, most of the existing ABE schemes are not suitable for providing confidentiality and fine-grained access control in these networks. Also, since in the most of ABE schemes, there is a single key generator authority for providing key delegation and user revocation services, these schemes may get into trouble when many users make queries for their secret-keys. Thus, such schemes seem not to be appropriate for large networks. In this paper, to address the mentioned problems, we put forward a lightweight revocable hierarchical ABE scheme called LW-RHABE. Our scheme provides lightweight encryption and decryption approaches. Also, it offers flexible and scalable key delegation and user revocation mechanisms. In the following, we list our main contributions in this work:
• Lightweight encryption mechanism: In LW-RHABE, the cloud server performs almost all expensive computational operations in the encryption phase without learning any information about the underlying data file, and data owners can encrypt their data, by performing lightweight computations.
• Lightweight decryption mechanism: Similar to the encryption phase, most of the expensive operations in the decryption phase can be offloaded onto the cloud server without leaking any information about the underlying data and data users' secret-keys.
• Flexible access control: LW-RHABE supports access tree as the access control policy. It is known that it provides a high level of flexibility in determining the access rights of data users.
• Flexible and scalable key delegation and user revocation mechanisms: In LW-RHABE, there are several key generator authorities that each of them can independently handle the key delegation and user revocation phases, and users can request their secret-keys from an arbitrary key authority without any constraints. Also, whenever the system needs more computational resources, the main authority can add some new key generator authorities.
• Security definition and security proof: We formalize the system model and the security definition for an LW-RHABE scheme. Moreover, we prove that our scheme is secure in the standard model and under the hardness assumption of the DBDH problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some related work. In Section III, we describe our system model and threat model. Section IV introduces some required background. The system definition and the security model are presented in Section V. Section VI describes the proposed LW-RHABE scheme in detail. In Sections VII and VIII, we present our security and performance analysis. Section IX summarizes our results and concludes this paper. We also prove the correctness of our LW-RHABE scheme in Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first introduced by Sahai and Waters [12] . In an ABE scheme, a sender can share its data with several expected users without knowing their public-keys. Afterward, three schemes [11] , [13] , [14] divided ABE schemes into three categories key-policy ABE (KP-ABE), ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE), and dual-policy ABE (DP-ABE). Lewko and Waters [15] proposed a decentralized ABE scheme. In their scheme, there is no requirement for any global authority, and any user can be considered as an authority. Li et al. [16] proposed an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption. In their scheme, the correctness of transformed ciphertexts to authorized users and unauthorized users can be simultaneously verified. Ostrovsky et al. [17] designed an ABE scheme supporting non-monotonic access control policies. Lewko et al. [18] designed a fully secure functional ABE scheme. Li et al. [19] proposed a KP-ABE scheme against continual auxiliary input leakage. Belguith et al. [20] designed a multi-authority ABE scheme with hidden access control policies. Li et al. [21] designed a revocable user collusion avoidance ABE scheme for cloud storage. Qian et al. [22] proposed a revocable attribute-based health record system. Their scheme provides an efficient on-demand user and attribute revocation mechanism. Also, their proposed scheme supports dynamic policy updates.
Recently, Li et al. [23] proposed an attribute-based file hierarchy access control scheme. Their scheme greatly saves computational resources as it enables a data owner to encrypt multiple data files on the same access level. However, most of ABE schemes suffer from heavy storage and computational overhead on the user side. It is known that such schemes are not suitable for IoT applications. To address these issues, by employing the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm, Yao et al. [ [32] proposed an attribute-based fine-grained access control with attribute-hiding policy for cloud-based IoT networks. In their work, by employing randomizable and the garbled Bloom filter techniques, the attribute information is totally hidden, and a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism is designed to help recipients to locate their attributes and to decrypt ciphertexts successfully. Yang et al. [33] proposed a lightweight fine-grained access control system for mobile health systems.
However, in most of the current ABE schemes, there is a single key authority for issuing and revoking users' secretkeys. Therefore, they seem not to be appropriate for large networks. To address this problem, combining two concepts hierarchical identity-based encryption and ABE, Wang et al. put forward the concept of hierarchical ABE (HABE) schemes [34] , [35] . Afterward, the HABE approach was applied to several cryptographic schemes. Liu et al. [36] proposed a time-based HABE scheme. Deng et al. [37] designed a CP-HABE scheme with short length ciphertexts. Using the hierarchical method in the key delegation phase, Huang et al. [38] designed a cloud-based data collaboration system. Wei et al. [39] proposed a revocable hierarchical attribute-based access control system for secure sharing of smart-health records in the public cloud storage. By applying the CP-HABE technique, Wang and Gao [40] designed a regulation scheme for the bitcoin system. In their work, they used the HABE approach to provide user anonymity and also traceability of dishonest users. Guo et al. [41] proposed an HABE scheme with continuous auxiliary input leakage. Li et al. [42] designed an HABE scheme with continuous leakage-resilience. In their work, they provided the formal definition and the security model for HABE schemes with continuous leakage-resilience. Also, they presented a CP-HABE scheme with continuous leakage-resilience. Luo et al. [43] designed an HABE friend discovery scheme for mobile social networks.
However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no lightweight ABE providing flexible and scalable key delegation and user revocation mechanisms. The interested reader is referred to [44] - [50] for further information about attribute-based systems and IoT networks.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the system model and threat model of our LW-RHABE scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 2 , our system consists of five generic entities Central Authority (CA), several Domain Authorities (DAs), the Cloud Service Provider (CSP), several data owners, and several data users. In the following, we describe the mentioned entities:
• CA: This entity is responsible for generating system parameters and initializing the DAs.
• DAs: These entities are responsible for generating secret-keys for data users according to their attributes and revoking them when they miss some attributes. Each DA provides key delegation and user revocation services associated with a specified attribute set. When a data user possesses an attribute, it selects an arbitrary DA supporting the attribute and asks it to generate the corresponding secret-key. The DA checks if the data user has the attribute or not. If so, it provides the data user with the requested secret-key. Moreover, DAs can help data owners in generating their public-keys and their secretkeys.
• CSP: The CSP possesses almost unlimited storage and computational resources. It provides storage and computational services for data owners and data users. When a data owner wants to encrypt its data, without leaking partial information, it can outsource most of heavy computational operations to the CSP. Also, the CSP can provide data users with computational services. Indeed, in the decryption phase, most of the expensive operations can be outsourced to the CSP such that no information about data users' secret-keys and underlying data files is leaked to the CSP.
• Data owners: Data owners model tiny sensors and smart devices in an IoT network. They possess limited processing and storage resources. They collect data from the environment and encrypt them under an access control policy. The encrypted data is outsourced to the CSP.
• Data users: Data users intend to access the outsourced data files for different purposes such as marketing, research, etc. Using their attribute secret-keys, they can request partial decryption from the CSP. Then, performing lightweight operations, they can recover their intended data files. As shown in Fig. 3 , our scheme consists of five phases System initialization, Key delegation, Data outsourcing, Decryption, and User revocation. Blow, we give an overview of each phase.
• System initialization: The CA manages this phase. It first generates the public parameters of the system and its own master secret-key. Then, it initializes a number of DAs to lighten the burden caused by key delegation and user revocation procedures.
• Key delegation: DAs operates this phase. In this phase, they generate secret-keys of data users according to their attributes. Also, they provide data owners with their secret-keys and public-keys.
• Data outsourcing: Data owners and the CSP manage this phase. When a data owner wants to outsource its collected data, to provide confidentiality and fine-grained access control, it first defines an access control policy, and then by using the computational power of the CSP, it encrypts the data under the access control policy. The encrypted data file is stored by the CSP for long-term storing and online/offline analysis.
• Decryption: The CSP and data users execute this phase. In this phase, using the CSP's computational resources, eligible data users can decrypt the outsourced encrypted data files and obtain their desired data.
• User revocation: DAs and the CSP manage this phase. When a data user misses an attribute, DAs update the secret and the public parameters of the system associated with the attribute. Then, the CSP re-encrypts the outsourced data files according to the new parameters without learning any information about the secret parameter and the outsourced data files. Finally, DAs update secret-keys corresponding to the attribute for the authorized data users.
B. THREAT MODEL
The CA and DAs are assumed to be trusted. They never grant unauthorized access rights to data users. Also, they never collude with the other parties. The CSP is assumed to be honest but curious. It does not collude with data users, and it always executes the given protocols correctly. However, it is curious to learn unauthorized information about outsourced data files. Data users are assumed to be malicious. If a data user is authorized for a data file, it does not share the data with the other parties. However, data users may collude with each other to obtain unauthorized information about the outsourced data. Data owners are also assumed to be trusted. We assumed that the communication channels between the CA and DAs, DAs and DUs, and DAs and the CSP are secure. Data files transmitted through the channels may not be eavesdropped or changed by the other parties. Moreover, it is assumed that there exists no direct communication channel between data owners and data users, and they have to communicate with each other through the CSP. Furthermore, the communication channels between DAs and data owners, the CSP and data owners, and the CSP and data users are assumed to be tamper-resistant. Although the data files transmitted through these channels may be eavesdropped by some malicious parties, they are not definitely tampered with.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
For an algorithm A , assume that O ← A (I ) denotes running A on input I and outputting O. Also, for an attribute set S, let x ← S denote the random selection of x form S. In the following, we give some cryptographic background related to our work.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
Bilinear map: Consider a prime number q and two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of order q. We say that a functionê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map if the following conditions hold:
• Non-degeneracy: There is a g ∈ G 1 such that e(g, g) = 1.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm computingê(g, h), for any g, h ∈ G 1 . Consider a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm G that (λ, q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) ← G (1 λ ), where λ is the security parameter of the system and (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) is the same as above.
In this work, we consider the Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman (DBDH) assumption on G :
The DBDH assumption:
This assumption states that for all PPT adversaries A , there is a negligible function negl such that:
where the probabilities are taken over the selection of g ∈ G 1 and α, β, γ , z ∈ Z q , and the randomness used in G and A .
B. ACCESS TREES
In an access tree, leaf nodes represent an attribute set, and inner nodes represent a threshold value set. Also, threshold value associated with each leaf node is equal to 1. Assume that T is an access tree, v a denotes the leaf node corresponding to an attribute a, k v denotes the threshold value associated with a node v, R T denotes root node T , L T denotes the leaf node set of the access tree, and T v denotes the subtree of T rooted at a node v. Let U be the universal attribute set, and T be an access tree. For a node v in T , consider a function F T v : 2 U → {0, 1} performing as follows:
• When v is the leaf node corresponding to an attribute a,
For a prime number q and an access tree T , consider an algorithm {q v (0)} v∈L T ← Share q (T , r) that shares a secret r ∈ Z q with respect to q and T as follows:
and other coefficients are selected uniformly at random from Z q .
• For each non-leaf node v with a polynomial q v , if children of v have not got their polynomials yet, assign a (k c i − 1)-degree polynomial q c i to the i-th child such that q c i (0) = q v (i), and other coefficients of q c i are selected uniformly at random from Z q . When this algorithm stops, a value q v i (0) is assigned to the leaf node v i .
V. SYSTEM DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the system definition and security definition for an LW-RHABE. • UpdateParams(params, MSK j , i 0 ): DAs executes this algorithm. On input the public parameters params, master secret-key of the DA running this algorithm, MSK j , and an attribute i 0 , it returns a secret parameters i 0 , a public parameterpk i 0 , and an update-key UKey i 0 associated with attribute i 0 .
• ReEnc(params, i 0 , CT T , UKey i 0 ): The CSP operates this algorithm. It takes as input the public parameters params, an attribute i 0 , a ciphertext CT T possessing a leaf node associated with i 0 , and an update-key UKey i 0 . It outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext CT T .
• UpdateKey(params, id u , i 0 , sk (j) i 0 ,u , UKey i 0 ): DAs execute this algorithm. Given the public parameters params, an identifier id u , an attribute i 0 , a secret-key of the data user associated with the attribute, sk (j) i 0 ,u , and an update-key UKey i 0 , this algorithm outputs an updated secret-keys k (j) i 0 ,u .
B. SECURITY MODEL
Security of LW-RHABE requires that for each PPT adversary that models the CSP or a group of unauthorized data users colluding with each other, the advantage of the adversary in obtaining partial information about the outsourced data files is a negligible function of the security parameter. In other words, no PPT adversary can distinguish the encryption of two data files of its choice. In the following, by using the indistinguishability experiment presented below, we formalize the security requirement.
Indistinguishability game LW-RHABE A , (λ): Let be an LW-RHABE scheme and A be a PPT adversary. Consider the following game: 1) Setup: A challenger selects a security parameter λ and a universal attribute set U. It runs (params, MSK ) ← Setup(1 λ , U) and for a natural number n, it selects n identifiers id 1 , . . . , id n and n subsets U 1 , . . . , U n .
to the adversary. 2) Phase 1: A makes polynomially many queries to the following oracle, and for each data user with identifier id u , the challenger keeps a list L id u which is initially empty. The output of the game is defined to be 1 if b = b , and 0 otherwise. We say that the adversary A wins the game, and we write LW-RHABE A , (λ) = 1 if the output of the game is equal to 1.
Definition 1: An LW-RHABE scheme is said to be secure if for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl such that: 
VI. OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present the concrete construction of LW-RHABE. The notations employed in this section are described in Table 1 . As mentioned in Subsection III-A, LW-RHABE consists of five phases System initialization, Key delegation, Data outsourcing, Decryption, and User revocation. In the following, each of the phases is described in detail.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
The CA first determines a universal attribute set U and a security parameter λ. It runs (params, MSK ) ← Setup(1 λ , U) and generates the public parameters params and master secret-key MSK . Then, for an integer n, it considers n subsets {U j } n j=1 of U and selects n identifiers {id j } n j=1 . It runs {PK j , MSK j } n j=1 ← KAGen(params, MSK , {id j } n j=1 , {U j } n j=1 ) and generates public-keys and the master secret-keys of DAs. params, {id j } n j=1 , and {PK j } n j=1 are published to the other entities, MSK is kept confidential by the CA, and MSK j is given to the j-th DA. In the following, the two mentioned algorithms are described in detail.
Setup(1 λ , U): On input the security parameter λ and the universal attribute set U, this algorithm first runs (λ, q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) ← G (1 λ ) and then selects x, y ← Z q and g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ← G 1 . It calculates h 1 = g x 1 , h 2 = g y 1 , msk 1 = g x 2 , msk 2 = h y 1 , P 1 =ê(g 2 , h 1 ) and P 2 =ê(h 2 , h 1 ). Then, for each i ∈ U, it selects s i ← Z q and sets pk i = g s i 1 . It selects a secure symmetric-key scheme S = (Enc, Dec) and a secure hash function H : G 2 → {0, 1} m , for an m ∈ Z + . Finally, it returns:
as the global public parameters, and
as the master secret-key of the CA. KAGen(params, MSK , {id j } n j=1 , {U j } n j=1 ): It first selects s j ← Z q and computes SK j = msk 1 g 4 id s j j (5) and
for j = 1, . . . , n. Then, it returns {PK j , MSK j } n j=1 , where MSK j = (SK j , {s j } i∈U j ).
B. KEY DELEGATION
In this phase, DAs generate data users' secret-keys according to their attributes, and they issue public-keys and secret-keys of data owners. When a data user possesses an attribute i ∈ U, it should ask a DA supporting the attribute to generate its secret-key. When a DA with identifier id j receives a request (i, id u ) from a data user, it first checks whether the data user has the attribute i or not. If not, it aborts. Otherwise, it executes sk (j) i,u ← User.KeyGen(params, MSK j , id u , i) and gives sk (j) i,u to the data user. Also, when a data owner asks a DA to generate its public-key and secret-key, the DA executes (sk O , pk O ) ← Owner.KeyGen(params) and gives sk O to the data owner. It also outsources pk O to the CSP. Note that public-key and secret-key of a data owner can be generated by itself. However, as they have limited computational resources, we assume that this service is provided by DAs.
User.KeyGen(params, MSK j , id u , i): Given MSK j = (SK j , {s i } i∈U j ) and an attribute i, this algorithm checks whether i ∈ U j or not. If so, it returns
Otherwise, it returns an error message ⊥. Owner.KeyGen(params): It first selects sk O ← Z q and sets pk
O , pk
C. DATA OUTSOURCING
In this phase, a data owner with a data file M and a secret-key sk O encrypts its data and stores the generated ciphertext to the CSP. At first, by defining an access tree T , it determines authorized data users to access its data. Then, it runs PCT T ← Owner.Enc(params, sk O , M , T ) and returns a partial ciphertext PCT T to the CSP. The CSP considers the data owner's public-key pk O and generates a ciphertext CT T ← CSP.Enc(params, pk O , PCT T ). The mentioned two algorithms are described as follows:
Owner Then, it runs {q v i (0)} v i ∈L T ← Share q (T , r ) and C ← Enc(M , k). Finally, it outputs the partial ciphertext
CSP.Enc(params, pk O , PCT T ): Given pk O = (pk (1) O , pk
and for each v i ∈ L T , it sets
When a data user with attribute set Att u wants to access an outsourced data file corresponding to a ciphertext CT T , it first checks if there is a subset S ⊆ Att u satisfying T or not. If not, it aborts. Otherwise, it considers the secret-key set {sk 
for each i ∈ S. Then, by using polynomial interpolation technique, it computes:
Finally, it returns partially decrypted ciphertext
User.Dec(params, M , CT T , s): It first computes
and then returns
E. USER REVOCATION When a data user misses an attribute i 0 , it should be made sure that the data user no longer has a valid secret-key associated with i 0 . To accomplish this, the following steps are performed:
• DAs update the secret parameter s i 0 and public parameter pk i 0 .
• According to the new parameters, the CSP re-encrypts ciphertexts with a leaf node associated with i 0 in their access trees.
• According to the new parameters, DAs update the authorized data users' secret-keys associated with i 0 . In practice, a DA first executes (s i 0 ,pk i 0 , Ukey i 0 ) ← UpdateParams(params, MSK j , i 0 ) and returns a new secret parameters i 0 , a new public parameterpk i 0 , and an update-key Ukey i 0 .s i 0 is given to the other DAs,pk i 0 is published to the system, and Ukey i 0 is given to the CSP and DAs. Then, for each ciphertext CT T with a leaf node associated with i 0 , by running CT T ← ReEnc(params, i 0 , CT T , UKey i 0 ), the CSP re-encrypts CT T to CT T . Also, when an authorized data user with identifier id u asks a DA to update its secret-key sk 
such that T has a leaf node associated with i 0 , and an update-key UKey i 0 , this algorithm outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext CT T = (T , C, C , C ,
UpdateKey(params, id u , i 0 , sk 
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that LW-RHABE is secure in the standard model. Theorem 2: If the DBDH problem is hard relative to G , then our construction is secure in the standard model.
Proof: Let be our LW-RHABE scheme and A be a PPT adversary in the game LW-RHABE A , (λ), where λ is the security parameter of the system. In the following, we prove that
for a negligible function negl. Consider another PPT adversary B aiming to solve the DBDH problem. B receives a tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, g α , g β , g γ , h =ê(P, P) z ) from a challenger, where (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) ← G (1 λ ), α, β, γ ← Z q , g ← G 1 , and z is either equal to αβγ or is chosen uniformly at random from Z q . B attempts to determine the case of z. It executes A as a subroutine as follow:
1) Setup: B chooses t 1 , t 2 ← Z q and calculates:
Then, it selects a universal attribute set U and selects s i ← Z q , for each i ∈ U. It returns the system public parameters params = (λ, q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , h 1 ,
where H and S are a secure hash function and a secure symmetric key scheme, respectively. Then, B selects g ← G 1 and assumes that, for an unknown value g 4 ∈ G 1 , the following equation holds
Also, it assumes that for unknown values α, γ −t 1 , g αβ , and msk 2 , MSK = (x = α, y = γ − t 1 , g 4 , msk 1 = g αγ , msk 2 , {sk i } i∈U ) is the master secret-key associated with params. Then, for a natural number n, B selects n subsets U 1 , . . . , U n , n identifiers {id j } n j=1 , and n random elements {s j } n i=j ⊂ Z q , and for each j = 1, . . . , n, computes: (29) and
B gives params, {id j } n j=1 , and {PK j } n j=1 to the adversary A . Note that, in the scheme presented in Section VI, we had
comparing Equation (31) with (5), one concludes that SK i is selected correctly. Moreover,
By Equation (6), we conclude that PK j is also chosen correctly. 2) Phase 1: When A makes a query on O User.KeyGen
to A and adds i into L id u . 3) Challenge: A declares two equal length plaintexts M 0 and M 1 , and an access tree T * such that there is no list L id u satisfying T . When B receives the plaintexts, it selects r ← Z q and assumes that for an unknown value sk O ∈ Z q , r = β − sk O . It calculates pk (1)
pk
and then for each i ∈ U, it sets
Afterwards, it computes k = H (h) (38) and
and
Therefore, assuming h =ê(g, g) αβγ and the randomness r in the Owner.Enc algorithm is equal to the unknown value β, one concludes that pk O is a valid public-key associated with sk O , and PCT T * is a valid partial ciphertext associated with T * . 4) Phase 2: A makes more queries, and B answers them as before. 5) Guess: A returns a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and B outputs 1 if and only if b = b. As we have seen, if h =ê(g, g) αβγ , then the ciphertext and the public-key given to A are valid. Therefore, if h = e(g, g) αβγ , the advantage of B in solving the DBDH problem is equal to the advantage of A in winning the game LW-RHABE A , (λ). In other words,
= Pr(LW-RHABE A , (λ)). (41) Also, when z is a uniform element of Z q , h =ê(g, g) z is also a uniform element of G 2 . Therefore, assuming that H and S are secure, one can see that PCT T does not leak any partial information about M b and therefore,
Combining the hardness assumption of the DBDH problem and two Equations (41) and (42), we conclude that
for a negligible function negl. This proves the theorem. 
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the performance of LW-RHABE by comparing its features with those provided by some similar work. Then, we compare the running time, storage cost, and communication overhead of LW-RHABE with the schemes presented in [57] , [59] . We present both the asymptotic analysis and actual execution time. The notations employed in this section are given in Table 3 .
In our asymptotic analysis, the execution time is calculated in terms of three types of expensive computational operations: the paring operation, the exponential operation in G 1 , and the exponential operation in G 2 . We ignore the other operations as they are significantly more efficient than the three operations.
We also measure the actual execution time and storage cost by using an Ubuntu 18.04 laptop with an Intel Core i5-2410M Processor 2.3 GHz, 6 GB RAM using python Pairing-Based Cryptography (pyPBC) library [60] , and Type A pairings. Moreover, we consider the XOR scheme [61] as the symmetric-key encryption scheme, the SHA-1 algorithm as the hash function, and And-gate access structures as access control policies. For a prime number p that p = 3 mod 4, Type A pairings are constructed on the curve E(F p ) : y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F p [62] . Assuming that (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) is the same as before, in this case, q is a factor of p + 1, and G 1 and G 2 are subgroups of E(F p ) and E(F p 2 ), respectively. In this section, it is assumed that p and q are a 512-bit and a 160-bit prime numbers, respectively. Thus, according to notations given in Table 3 , we have l Z q = 160, l G 1 = 512, and l G 2 = 1024.
A. CHARACTERISTICS COMPARISON
As shown in Table 2 , LW-RHABE is the only scheme providing flexible key delegation and user revocation mechanisms. Indeed, in other multi-authority schemes, either for each attribute in the universe, there is only one key generator authority supporting the attribute, or for each data user in the system, there is only one key authority supporting the data user. However, as shown in the previous section, in LW-RHABE, there is no restriction for data users and DAs. Also, only LW-RHABE can provide a lightweight encryption mechanism. Moreover, we see that [38] , [55] , [57] , [59] , and LW-RHABE offer lightweight decryption mechanisms. In the other schemes, the decryption phase is costly for data users. Also, we see that only schemes [15] , [37] , [58] , and LW-RHABE have adaptive security in the standard model.
B. ASYMPTOTIC AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As shown in Fig. 4 , our proposed encryption mechanism is significantly more efficient than the schemes presented in [57] and [59] . The mentioned fact is confirmed by the data given in Table 5 . Moreover, in Fig. 5 , we see that the decryption time in LW-RHABE is almost the same as the schemes [57] and [59] that both of them provide lightweight decryption mechanisms.
Also, as we see in Fig. 6 , our scheme significantly decreases the communication overhead from data owners to the CSP. The reason is that, in LW-RHABE, a data owner transfers only lightweight partial ciphertexts to the CSP instead of full ciphertexts. Furthermore, observing the given data in Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8 , one concludes that the storage overhead in LW-RHABE is acceptable.
IX. CONCLUSION
We designed a revocable lightweight hierarchical attributebased encryption scheme for IoT networks. In our scheme by performing very efficient computational operations, data owners modeling tiny sensors and smart devices in an IoT e(tk i,u , C i ) e(PK j i , tk i,u )ê(t u , C i ) =ê
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network can encrypt their collected data. Also, users can outsource most of the computational operations in the decryption phase to the cloud server. Moreover, our scheme offers a flexible and scalable key delegation and user revocation mechanisms. Indeed, in our scheme, there are several key authorities managing key delegation and user revocation in a distributed way. We provided the security definition for the new primitive and proved its security in the standard model and under the hardness assumption of the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. Our performance and security analysis demonstrated that our proposed scheme is efficient, secure, and suitable for IoT applications.
APPENDIX CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
Theorem 3: The decryption phase is correct. Proof: Consider an access tree T , an attribute set S satisfying T , a data user's identifier id u , a ciphertext CT T = (T , C, C , C , {C i } v i ∈L T , {C i } v i ∈L T ) associated with the access tree, a secret-key set {sk (j i ) i,u } i∈S associated with S and id u such that sk (j i ) i,u is generated by a DA with public-key PK j i , and a token set tk u = {t u , tk i,u , tk i,u } i∈S . In the following, we prove the correctness of the decryption phase. We have the equation can be derived, as shown at the top of this page:
This proves Equation (13) . Also, the correctness of Equations (14) , (15) is clear. Combining Equations (10) and (15), we have: M s −1 C = (P sr 1 P −sr 2 ) s −1 P r 2 = P r 1 .
Therefore,
Comparing Equations (8) and (45), one concludes that the decryption phase is correct. Theorem 4: The revocation phase is correct. Proof: We first show that for the new parameters and update key (s i 0 ,pk i 0 , UKey i 0 ) ← UpdateParams(params, MSK j , i 0 ), a re-encrypted ciphertext CT T ← ReEnc(params, i 0 , CT T , UKey i 0 ) is a valid ciphertext associated with the updated public parameterpk i 0 . Then, we show that an updated secret-keys k (j) i 0 ,u ← UpdateKey(params, id u , i 0 , sk (j) i 0 ,u , UKey i 0 ) is also a valid secret-key associated with the new secret parameters i 0 .
We have:
Comparing (46) with (11) , one concludes that CT T is a valid ciphertext associated withpk i 0 . Also, we have: By Equation (7), we see thats k (j) i 0 ,u is a valid secret-key associated withs i 0 .
